Ontological and epistemological terrains revisited.
The present commentary discusses the scientific legitimacy of theories confined to correlations of observables and those that specify the mechanisms governing the relations between observable events. Operant analysts frame the theoretical differences misleadingly when the operant approach is portrayed as addressing environmental influence for effecting change but cognitive approaches are depicted as disembodied from environmental influences and thus can only provide correlates with action. In point of fact, both approaches encompass environmental influences. The major issues in contention are whether human thinking is entirely or only partially shaped by environmental influences; whether the influences in the person-environment relation flow unidirectionally or bidirectionally; and whether human thought serves a determinative function or is a functionless epiphenomenon. Proponents of epiphenomenalism regard other people's thinking as functionless by-products of conditioned responses, but present their own thoughts on matters as the right ones that provide functional guides for structuring interventions. This commentary discusses the self-negating nature of the epiphenomenalism argument. It also corrects misunderstandings and misrepresentations of self-efficacy theory.